

QUALIFIED AND NOT QUALIFIED TIME STAMP AUTHORITY CP_CPS

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

This manual is intended to describe the rules and operational procedures adopted by digital certification structure of InfoCert S.p.A. (hereinafter briefly referred to as “InfoCert”) for the provision of a qualified and not qualified times stamping trust service according to eIDAS Regulation.

InfoCert provides digital time stamping service for both digitally signed and unsigned documents.

Generally, the time stamping service allows you to establish the existence of a computer document before a certain time, associating a date and time from a certified time source with the digital evidence obtained from the document. Digital evidence is subject to time stamping when its associated timestamp is generated: the timestamp is a digitally signed data record that securely and verifiably links any digital document to a time reference (date and time).

The timestamp is signed and issued by a trust service provider that provides time stamping systems (Time Stamping Authority (TSA)) that certifies the trust system keys (Time Stamp Unit (TSU)) to which users direct their requests according to need; anyone who has requested and stored a time stamp for a particular document will subsequently be able to prove that this document actually existed at the date/time reported in the stamp signed by that TSU/TSA certification chain.

In particular, the digitally signed document time stamp allows for the verification and validation of the digital signature, even if the author's certificate is expired or revoked, provided that the time stamp was assigned to the document when the certificate was valid.

The service provided by InfoCert meets BTSP policy as defined in ETSI319421 [2] identified by the OID.

| Description | OID |
|--|----------------|
| itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) time-stamp-policy(2023) policy-identifiers(1) best-practices-ts-policy (1) | 0.4.0.2023.1.1 |

Table 1 – OID

This document describes the policies relating to the time stamping service (TSU) and the policies relating to the issuing of the signature certificate installed and used in the TSU itself.

1.2 Document name and identification

This document is called "Qualified and not qualified Time Stamping Service – Certificate Practice Statement" and is characterised by the document code: **ICERT-INDI-TSA-ENG**.

For version and release level information, please see the cover page and the par. 9.12.

This document refers to the following policies defined by Object identifier (OID):

| Description | OID |
|---|------------------|
| InfoCert | 1.3.76.36 |
| Certification-service-provider | 1.3.76.36.1 |
| Certificate-policy | 1.3.76.36.1.1 |
| Qualified time stamping service - certificate policy | 1.3.76.36.1.1.40 |
| Not qualified time stamping service – certificate policy (certificates for non-InfoCert TSUs) | 1.3.76.36.1.1.41 |
| Not qualified time stamping service – certificate policy | 1.3.76.36.1.1.42 |
| Qualified time stamping service with ECC certificates | 1.3.76.36.1.1.50 |

Table 2 – Policies defined by Object identifier

In addition, all the certificates comply with the instruction of AgID Resolution n. 121/2019 with the amendments of the subsequent AgID Resolution n. 147/2019, effective since July 5, 2019 and contain an additional PolicyIdentifier element, with value AgIDcert (OID 1.3.76.16.6) in the CertificatePolicies field (OID 2.5.29.32).

1.3 Participants and responsibilities

1.3.1 Time Stamping Authority

The **Time Stamping Authority** is the trusted third party that provides the time stamping service.

InfoCert is the trust service provider (**TSA**) that provides the qualified and not qualified time stamping service (TSU) by operating in accordance with the eIDAS Regulation and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute standards (ETSI).

Complete data of the organisation that acts as CA are as follows:

| | |
|--|---|
| Company name | InfoCert – Società per azioni |
| | Company managed and coordinated by Tinexta S.p.A. |
| Registered office | Piazzale Flaminio 1/B, 00196 – Roma (RM) |
| Operational offices | Via Gian Domenico Romagnosi 4 - 00196 Roma(RM) Via Fernanda Wittgens n. 2, 20123 Milano (MI) Piazza Luigi da Porto n. 3, 35131 Padova (PD) |
| Telephone number | 0683669635 |
| Legal Representative | Danilo Cattaneo as Managing Director |
| Tax Identification Number and Business Register Number | 07945211006 |
| REA Number | RM – 1064345 |
| VAT Number | 07945211006 |
| Website | https://www.infocert.it |

1.3.2 Subscribers

The **Subscriber** is the natural or legal person to whom the time stamp is provided and who enters into the contract with InfoCert.

1.3.3 Relying Parties

The individual who receives a digital document that is time stamped and relies on the validity of the stamp must evaluate the correctness and validity of the document itself, in the contexts where it is used.

1.3.4 Authority

1.3.4.1 Agenzia per l'Italia Digitale - AgID

The Agenzia per l'Italia Digitale (**AgID**), is the trust service provider authority in compliance with article 17 of the eIDAS Regulation . In this role, AgID monitors qualified trust service providers established in Italy to ensure they comply with the requirements set out in the Regulation.

1.3.4.2 Conformity Assessment Body

The conformity assessment body (**CAB**), is an accredited body as provided for under the eIDAS Regulation in charge of assessing the conformity of qualified trust service providers and their qualified trust services in line with the applicable regulations and standards.

1.4 Time stamping service usage

1.4.1 Permitted uses

Time stamps issued by InfoCert, as specified in this CPS, are qualified under the eIDAS Regulation.

The certificate issued by the TSA will be used to verify the stamp.

InfoCert provides the GoSign Desktop product, downloadable from the InfoCert site, to check stamps. Additional verification products may be available on the market with features and limitations specified by the manufacturer.

1.4.2 Prohibited uses

Use outside of the limits and contexts specified in the CPS and contracts is prohibited.

1.5 Policy Administration

1.5.1 Contacts

InfoCert is responsible for definition, publication and update of this document. Questions, claims, observations and requests for clarification regarding this CPS must be sent to the following addresses:

Company name

InfoCert – S.p.A
Digital Certification Service Manager
Piazza Luigi da Porto n. 3, 35131 Padova (PD)

Telephone number 0683669635
 Digital signature Contact Center <https://help.infocert.it/contatti/for more details>
 Website <https://www.firma.infocert.it>, <https://www.infocert.it>
 E-mail firma.digitale@legalmail.it

1.5.2 Parties responsible for approving the CPS

This Certificate Practice Statement has been approved by the Corporate Management following a review by the Head of Security and Policy, the Privacy Officer, the Head of Certification Services, the Head of Legal Department, the Head of Regulatory Affairs Manager.

1.5.3 Approval procedures

Drafting and approval of this Certificate Practice Statement are carried out in accordance with the procedures described in the Company's Quality Management System ISO 9001:2015.

At least once a year, the Trust Service Provider checks the compliance of this Certificate Practice Statement with its certification service process.

1.6 Definitions and Acronyms

1.6.1 Definitions

The definitions used when drawing up this document are listed below. For the terms defined by the eIDAS Regulation [1] and CAD [2] please refer to the definitions established therein. Where appropriate, the corresponding English term generally used in journalism, in standards and technical documents, is given in square brackets.

| Expiry | Definition |
|---|---|
| Certificate Practice Statement (CPS) | The Operating Manual defines the procedures that the TSP applies when carrying out the service. When the Manual was being drawn up, the indications expressed by the Supervisory Authorities and those found in international literature were followed. |
| Certificate Revocation List (CRL) | This is a list of certificates that have been rendered "invalid" before their natural deadline. The operation is called revocation if permanent, suspension, if temporary. When a certificate is revoked or suspended, its series number is added to the CRL, which is then published in the public register. |
| Certificate revocation or suspension | This is the operation with which the CA cancels the validity of the certificate before its natural deadline. |
| Conformity Assessment Body (CAB) | Accredited body as foreseen under the eIDAS Regulation capable of carrying out the conformity assessment of the qualified trust service provider and of their qualified trust services. It issues the CAR. |
| Coordinated Universal Time | Time-scales with precision to the second as defined in ITU-R Recommendation TF.460-5. |
| Customer | Subject with whom Infocert has formalized a service supply contract in exchange for compensation |
| Digest (imprint) | Message imprint after applying a hash algorithm. |
| Electronic Document | Any content stored in electronic format, especially text or sound, visual or audio-visual recordings (see eIDAS [1]). |
| Electronic signature | Data in electronic form, enclosed or connected by logical association with other electronic data and used by the TSU to issue a time stamp. |
| Electronic signature certificate | An electronic certificate that links the validation data of an electronic signature to a TSU. |

| <i>Expiry</i> | <i>Definition</i> |
|--|---|
| Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) | Protocol defined by the IETF in the RFC 6960; it allows the applications to check the certificate's validity more rapidly and punctually compared to the CRL, of which it shares the data. |
| PKCS#10 | Acronym for Public Key Cryptography Standards, it is a set of standards for public key cryptography developed by RSA Labs: they define the syntax of digital certificate and encrypted messages, in particular PKCS#10 defines the structure of the public key certificate request for a pair of asymmetric keys. |
| Private key | The element of the pair of asymmetrical keys, used by the TSU to sign a time stamp (see CAD ii). |
| Public Key | The element of the pair of asymmetrical keys intended to be made public, with which the time stamp is verified. |
| Qualified temporary electronic validation | A temporary electronic validation that meets the requirements found in article 42 of the eIDAS Regulation (see eIDAS i). |
| Qualified trust service | A trust service that meets the relevant requirements established in the Regulation (see eIDAS i). |
| Validation | The process of verifying and confirming the validity of a time stamp. |
| Validation data | Data used to validate a time stamp. |
| Time stamp | Electronic data that connects other electronic data with time evidence demonstrating that this data existed at that time. |
| Qualified trust service provider | A trust service provider who provides one or more qualified trust services and to whom the supervisory body grants the title of qualified trust service provider (see eIDAS i). |
| SHA-256 | The SHA acronym stands for Secure Hash Algorithm and is a cryptographic function used to calculate the hash or digest or imprint. 256 is the number of bits in the resulting message. |
| Temporary electronic validation | Data in electronic format that connects other data in electronic format to a particular time and date, in order to prove that the latter existed at that moment in time (see eIDAS i). |
| Time stamp | Electronic data that connects other electronic data with time evidence demonstrating that this data existed at that time. |
| Trust service | An electronic service normally provided at a fee and consisting in the following elements: creation, verification and validation of electronic signatures, electronic seals or temporary electronic validations, electronic services of certificate forwarding and certificates relating to these services; or creation, verification and validation of website authentication certificates; or storage of signatures, seals or electronic certificates relating to these services (see eIDAS i) |
| Trust service provider | A natural or legal person who provides one or more trust services, either as a qualified or unqualified trust service provider (see eIDAS i) |
| Validation | The process of verifying and confirming the validity of a time stamp. |
| Validation data | Data used to validate a time stamp. |
| X.509 | Standard for defining the format of the digital public key certificate format. It also defines the characteristics of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). |

Table 3 – Definitions

1.6.2 Acronyms and abbreviations

| <i>Acronym</i> | <i>Meaning</i> |
|----------------|---|
| AgID | Agenzia per l'Italia Digitale: (Agency for Digital Italy) Trust Service Providers Supervisory Board |
| BTSP | Best Practices Time-Stamp Policy - see ETSI319421 |
| CA | Certification Authority |
| CAB | Conformity Assessment Body |
| CAD | Digital Administration Code |
| CAR | Conformity Assessment Report |
| CC | Common Criteria |
| CRL | Certificate Revocation List |
| DMZ | Demilitarised Zone |
| eIDAS | Electronic Identification and Signature Regulation |

| Acronym | Meaning |
|---------------------|---|
| ETSI | European Telecommunications Standards Institute |
| HSM | Hardware Secure Module: it is a security device for the creation of the signature, with functions that are similar to smart cards, but with a larger memory and superior performance |
| ISO | International Organisation for Standardisation: founded in 1946, ISO is an international organisation made up of national bodies for standardisation |
| LDAP | Lightweight Directory Access Protocol: protocol used to access the certificates register; |
| OID | Object Identifier: consists of a sequence of numbers, registered according to the procedure indicated in the ISO/IEC 6523 standard which identifies a certain object within a hierarchy |
| PEC | Certified E-mail |
| PKCS | Public-Key Cryptography Standards |
| PKI | Public Key Infrastructure: group of resources, processes and technological means that allow trusted third parties to check and/or guarantee the identity of a subject, as well as associate a public key to a subject |
| RFC | Request for Comment: document that holds information or specifications regarding new research, innovations and methods in the IT world, requested to be assessed by the community by the writers |
| SGSI | Information Security Management System |
| SSCD – QSSCD | Secure Signature Creation Device: device for the creation of an electronic signature. Qualified Secure Signature Creation Device: qualified device for the creation of an electronic signature. |
| TSA | Time-Stamping Authority: Trust service provider using one or more time stamp emission systems - see ETSI319421 |
| TST | Time-Stamp Token: term used in international advertising for the time stamp |
| TSU | Time-Stamping Unit: a set of hardware and software managed as a single time stamping system consisting of only one active key - see ETSI319421 |
| TSP | Trust Service Provider see Trust service provider |
| UTC | Coordinated Universal Time as defined in ITU-R TF.460-6 (2000) - see ETSI319421 |
| X509 | ITU-T Standard for the PKIs |

Table 4 – Acronyms and abbreviations

2 PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1 Time stamp preservation

All time stamps emitted by a validation system are stored in a non-editable digital archive for twenty years.

2.2 Publication of certificate information

2.2.1 Publication of the Certificate Practice Statement

This document, the list of certification key certificates and other information relating to the TSA provided for by law are published in a list of certifiers (at link <https://eid.as.agid.gov.it/TL/TSL-IT.xml>) and on the Certification Authority's website (see § 1.5.1).

2.2.2 Publication of the public key for time stamp verification

The integrity and authenticity of the TSU server public key is guaranteed as it is distributed by issuing a public key certificate:

- The certification request is issued by authorised personnel and forwarded to CA InfoCert dedicated to the certification of time stamp keys.

- The CA generates the certificate.

The time stamp certificate format, containing the TSU public key, meets that specified in ETSI319422 [3]; in this way it, full readability and verifiability is guaranteed in the context of eIDAS and Italian legislation.

The public key used by TSU is distributed through the certificate.

2.2.3 Publication of revocation and suspension lists

The revocation and suspension lists are published in the public register of certificates accessible with LDAP HTTP protocol at the address in the "CRL Distribution Points" attribute of the certificate. This access can be made via the software made available by InfoCert and/or the functions found in the products on the market which interpret the LDAP and/or HTTP protocol.

2.3 Publication period or frequency

2.3.1 Publication frequency of the CPS

Frequency of publication of the Certificate Practice Statement varies to reflect any changes that have occurred. For major changes, the CA must undergo an audit by an accredited CAB, submit the certification report (CAR—Conformity Assessment Report) and the Certificate Practice Statement to the Supervisory Authority (AgID) and wait for a publication permission to be granted.

2.4 Controlling access to public archives

The information regarding the published certificates and certificate practice statement are public, the CA did not place any restrictions on access to their reading and implemented all counter-measures to prevent unauthorised changes/deletion.

3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

3.1 Naming

3.1.1 Type of names

The key used by the TSU in the certificate is identified with the assigned Distinguished Name (DN), which should therefore be valued and compliant with the X500 standard. Certificates are issued according to ETSI standards for issuing qualified certificates for time stamping.

3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful

The Distinguished Name (DN) certificate contains a name that identifies the TSU used, the month and year of issue.

3.1.3 Subscribers' anonymity and pseudonym

n/a

3.1.4 Rules for interpreting various name forms

InfoCert complies with the X500 standard

3.1.5 Uniqueness of names

The Distinguished Name (DN) certificate contains a name that identifies the TSU used, the month and year of issue: each TSU uses a unique certificate.

3.2 Initial identity validation

n/a

3.3 Identification and authentication for the renewal of the keys and certificates

n/a

3.4 Identification and authentication for Revocation or Suspension Requests

n/a

4 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

4.1 Request for time stamp emission or verification

4.1.1 Who can apply for time stamp emission or verification

The time stamping service is intended to address time stamp emission or verification request for electronic documents from the TSU server by means of properly configured software modules.

The request for time stamp emission or verification may be made by the **Subscriber/Relying Party** using the signature/verification software provided by InfoCert, which allows you to affix the timestamp to digitally signed and non-signed documents, and allows immediate verification.

The Subscriber may use its own software through a protocol defined in RFC 3161, RFC 5816 and profiled by the ETSI 319 422 standard using URLs and credentials agreed with InfoCert.

Once the request has been accepted and registered and proper checks are carried out, the TSU server processes it, generates the time stamp and sends it back to the Subscriber/Relying Party.

Note: the InfoCert certifier site has stamp affixing and verification software, for both a signed document or an unsigned document.

4.1.2 Registration process and responsibility

In the process, the different figures involved have different roles and run parallel with the successful outcome of the issuance:

- The Subscriber/Relying Party is responsible for submitting the request for time stamp issuance or verification through the software modules for this purpose provided by the InfoCert trust service provider.
- InfoCert is ultimately responsible for the success of the time stamp generation process.

4.2 Processing the request

The request is processed as follows:

- The Subscriber submits, through TSA's procedures, a time stamp request for the electronic document to the TSU server, eventually viewing it;
- the request contains the imprint of the electronic document to be stamped; the SHA-256 imprint algorithm (secure hash algorithm 256-bit).

4.3 Time stamp issue

The time stamp is automatically issued by a secure electronic system (TSU server), managed by TSA, able to:

- connect to different time sources and accurately calculate the date and time of time stamp generation with reference to Coordinated Universal Time (UTC);
- generate the data record containing the specified information [iii];
- digitally sign (in the technical meaning of the term) the data record.

Upon receipt of the request, the time stamp is issued as follows:

- The TSU, upon receipt of the time stamp request, generates the data record as defined in [iii]: this record contains, amongst the various information, the same imprint and the current date/time;
- The TSU server signs the generated data record, obtaining the time stamp;
- When the time stamp generation procedure has successfully completed, the latter is sent to the Subject.

4.3.1 Synchronization of systems

Systems involved in generating timestamps, certificates and CRLs are synchronized using a precise, accurate and reliable time reference using at least two time sources synchronized via signals provided by GPS, Galileo and GLONASS satellite systems.

4.4 Certificate Acceptance

n/a

4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage

The pair of keys and stamp certificate are solely used to sign the association between the date-time and the imprint of the document.

4.6 Certificate Renewal

The certificate does not provide for renewal.

4.7 Certificate Re-Key

A new certificate is issued for each TSU every 3 (three) months.

4.8 Certificate Modification

n/a

4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension

The revocation or suspension of a certificate removes its validity prior to the established expiry date and means the stamps placed after the revocation has been published, are no longer valid. Revoked or suspended certificates are added to the revocation and suspension list (CRL) signed by the TSA who issued them, published in the register of certificates on an established periodic basis. The TSA can impose an unscheduled issuing of the CRL under particular circumstances. The revocation and suspension is effective as of the list publication date, proven by the event registration date in the TSA Audit Journal.

The information on the revocation status remains available at the Certification Authority for 20 (twenty) years after the expiration of the TSA root certificate through the issuance and the preservation of the latest CRL.

4.9.1 Circumstances for revocation

The conditions under which the time stamp certificate may be revoked are:

1. the private key has been compromised, that is, one of the following cases has arisen:
 - the secure signature device that contains the key has been violated;
 - key or its activation code (PIN) secrecy has been breached;
 - some kind of event has occurred that has compromised the level of the key's reliability.
2. significant failure to comply with this document is verified.

4.9.2 Who can request revocation

The certificate may be revoked or suspended by TSA for reasons stated in § 4.9.1.

4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request

n/a

4.9.4 Revocation request grace period

The grace period of the CRL is the period of time between the time of publication by the TSA of the next CRL and the time when the current CRL expires. In order not to cause disruption to any involved party, this period is longer than the time period TSA needs to generate and publish a new CRL. This way, the current CRL remains valid at least until it is replaced by the new CRL.

4.9.5 Time within which CA must process the revocation request

The request is processed immediately as soon as the TSA has verified the reason for revocation.

4.9.6 Requirements for verifying the revocation

n/a

4.9.7 CRL issuance frequency

The revoked or suspended certificates are added to a revocation and suspension list (CRL) signed by TSA and published in the Public Register. The CRL publication is scheduled every hour (ordinary issuing). Under particular circumstances, the TSA may impose an unscheduled issuance of the CRL (immediate extraordinary issue), for example in the case where the revocation or suspension of a certificate occurs if there is a suspicion that the private key's secrecy has been compromised (immediate revocation or suspension). The CRL is always issued in its entirety. When the CRL is published, it is certified by using the date provided by the Time Stamping Authority InfoCert system as temporal reference and this recording is made in the control journal. Each element in the CRL list contains the date and time of revocation or suspension in the specific extension. The CRL to be consulted for the specific certificate is indicated in the certificate itself in compliance with current standards.

4.9.8 Maximum latency for CRLs

The time that elapses between the revocation or suspension request and its completion with publication of the CRL is no more than one hour.

4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability

As well as the publication of the CRL in the LDAP registers and http, InfoCert also makes an OCSP service available to verify certificate status. The service's URL is shown on the certificate. The service is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

4.10 Certificate Status Services

4.10.1 Operational characteristics

Information on the status of the certificates is available via CRL and the OCSP service. The serial number on the revoked certificate remains in CRL even after the certificate's validity has expired and at least until the TSA certificate expires.

The information provided by the OCSP service for the certificates is updated in real time.

4.10.2 Service availability

The OCSP service and CRLs are available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

4.11 End of Subscription

n/a

4.12 Key Escrow and Recovery

n/a

5 FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS

TSP InfoCert has developed an information security system for the digital certification service. The implemented security system is divided into three levels:

- a physical level that aims to guarantee the security of the environments in which the TSP manages the service,
- a procedural level, with strictly organisational aspects,
- a logical level, via the arrangement of technological hardware and software measures that deal with the problems and risks relating to the kind of service and infrastructure used.

This security system was created to prevent risks deriving from system, network and application malfunctions, as well as the unauthorised interception or change of data.

A copy of the InfoCert security policy can be requested from the certified e-mail address infocert@legalmail.it.

InfoCert Security policies are reviewed no less than yearly; they are also updated against any significant changes. Each revision is tracked in the document even when no changes had to be made.

5.1 Physical Security Controls

The measures adopted provide adequate security guarantees regarding:

- Characteristics of the building and construction;
- Active and passive theft prevention systems;
- Physical access control;
- Electrical power supply and air conditioning;
- Protection against fires;
- Protection against flooding;
- Magnetic support storage methods;
- Magnetic support storage sites.

5.1.1 Site location and construction

The primary InfoCert delivery site is located in Padua. The Disaster Recovery site is located in Mialn and is connected to the Data Centre mentioned above via a specific and redundant connection on two different 40 Gbit/s MPLS circuits that can be upgraded to 100 Gbit/s.

Protected areas with the highest levels of security, both physical and logical, within which there is certified IT equipment that makes up the heart of the digital certification services, timestamp and remote and automatic signature are located within both.

For services that need business continuity with RTO/RPO values close to zero, some components of the time stamping services relating to publication of the CRLs, the OCSP and some Front-End services are hosted on cloud infrastructure, respectively, in the Frankfurt, Ireland and Milan European regions.

The suppliers employed by Infocert have compliance certifications in accordance with the ISO/IEC 27001:2022 e ISO/IEC 9001:2015 standards. Concerning the cloud infrastructure, the suppliers also have the ISO/IEC 27017:2015 and ISO/IEC 27018:2019 certifications.

5.1.2 Physical access

Access to the Data Centre is regulated by InfoCert security procedures. There is a bunker area within the Data Centre where the CA systems are located and for which yet another level of security is required.

5.1.3 Power supply and air conditioning

The service provision site in Padua is certified at the level of Rating 3 according to ANSI TIA 942.

The technical rooms are fitted with an electric power supply system designed to prevent breakdowns and, above all, disservices. The system's power supply includes the most modern technology with a view to increasing reliability and ensuring redundancy in the most essential functions for the services provided.

The power supply infrastructure includes:

- UPSs, fitted with AC accumulators;
- AC voltage available (220-380V AC);
- Redundant power supply cabinets with protected lines and with a size suitable for the agreed absorption;
- Emergency generator service;
- Automatic commutation system and synchronisation between generators, network and batteries (STS).

Each technological cabinet installed at the Data Centre uses two electrical lines that guarantee the HA in the event that one of the two available lines is interrupted.

The technological cabinet is monitored remotely; continuous controls are carried out on the status of the electric lines (on/off) and the electrical power absorbed (each line should not exceed 50% of the load).

The technical area is normally maintained between 20° and 27° with a relative humidity level between 30% and 60%. The plants are fitted with condensation batteries with condensation collection and drainage system and controlled by anti-flooding probes. The entire conditioning system is served by emergency generators in the event of a power cut. Cabinet cooling capacity is guaranteed with a maximum foreseen load of 10kW and a maximum of 15kW on two cabinets side by side.

5.1.4 Flood prevention and protection

The area where the property is located does not present environmental risk from any "dangerous" installations in the vicinity. When the building was being designed, specific measures were taken to insulate the buildings from potential danger, such as those housing the electrical generator and central heating plant.

The area that houses the equipment is on the ground floor in a raised position compared to the road level.

5.1.5 Fire prevention and protection

The Data Centre has a smoke detection system managed by an analogical power station referred to as NOTIFIER, with optical sensors positioned in the room and ceiling and air sample sensors installed underground and in the air ducts.

The automatic fire detection system is connected to automatic ARGON IG-01 ecological gas extinguishing plants.

Should the two detectors trigger in the same area, the extinguishing discharge is applied to the area involved.

Each fire extinguishing compartment has a specific extinguishing plant.

There are also portable extinguishers in compliance with current regulations and laws.

5.1.6 Storage media

As far as the storage platform is concerned, the solution provides the use of Net App (FAS 8060) systems for the NAS part. For the SAN part instead, an infrastructure based on Infinidat technology was implemented that includes n.2 InfiniBox enclosure of generation F4000 and F6000; for the CA, the infrastructure is based on Pure Storage technology.

5.1.7 Waste disposal

InfoCert is ISO 14001 certified for sustainable environmental management. The company adopts internal procedures for the secure deletion of data from enterprise-class storage devices through the use of suppliers who guarantee its deletion. Its waste management cycle is compliant with current national regulations and uses exclusively suppliers authorized for the transport and destination of the same.

5.1.8 Off-site back-up

In the Disaster Recovery site, the onsite backup is locally stored and a backup copy is stored on third party off-site locations.

5.2 Procedural controls

5.2.1 Key roles

The key roles are held by individuals with the necessary experience, professionalism and technical and legal skills, that are continually checked on an annual basis.

The list of names and the organisation chart of the individuals in key roles was deposited at the AgID upon first accreditation and is constantly updated to follow the corporate organisation's natural evolution.

5.3 Personnel control

5.3.1 Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements

Once the yearly Human Resources plan has been drawn up, the Head of the Department/Business unit identifies the specifications and resource skills to be added (*job profile*). Following this, and in conjunction with the selection manager, the recruitment and selection process begins.

5.3.2 Background check procedures

The identified candidates participate in the selection process through an initial cognitive-motivational interview with the head of HR and a second technical interview with the head of the Department/Business unit, aimed at checking the skills stated by the candidate. Further verification tools are exercises and tests.

5.3.3 Training requirements

As a guarantee that no single individual can singularly compromise or alter the global system security or do anything unauthorised, system operating management is assigned to different people, with separate, clearly defined roles. The staff member assigned to the certification service programming and distribution is an InfoCert employee and was selected on the basis of his/her experience in programming, creating and managing IT services as well as of his/her reliability and confidentiality. Training is periodically planned to develop familiarity with the assigned roles. In particular, before starting work, personnel are trained in order to provide every kind of skill (technical, organisational and procedural) required to carry out the tasks assigned.

5.3.4 Retraining frequency

Training needs are analysed at the start of each year in order to define the training activities to be provided throughout the year. The analysis is organised as follows:

- Meeting with Corporate Management to collect the data relating to the training requirements needed to satisfy company aims;
- Interview with managers to gather data on training requirements specific to their own areas;
- Collected data is returned to Corporate Management for training plan closure and approval.

Within the month of February, the defined Training Plan is shared with the employee staff and published.

5.3.5 Job rotation frequency

The presence on site or in agile work mode (smart working) is distributed over a time slot from 08:00 to 19:00 from Monday to Friday.

The supervision of the production environments during the night and during the holidays is guaranteed through an on-call shifts plan that is drawn up by the business unit manager monthly, at least 10 (ten) days in advance. Depending on the need, the interventions can be conducted remotely (tele-intervention) or request access to the premises.

Without prejudice to the possession of the necessary technical and professional requirements, the Company aims to alternate as many workers as possible in the on-call shifts plan, giving priority to employees who request to do so.

5.3.6 Sanctions for unauthorized actions

Sanctions are imposed to the employee staff in accordance with the National Employment Contract for Metalworkers and Installation of Private Industrial Plants ("CCNL Metalmeccanici e installazione impianti industria privata").

5.3.7 Checks on non-employed staff

External employee access is managed by specific company policy.

5.3.8 Documents to be supplied by personnel

When hired, the employee must provide a valid copy of an identification document, a valid health card and a passport photo for his/her access badge. S/he will subsequently have to fill out and sign the authorisation to process personal data and the commitment to not disclose confidential news and/or documents. Lastly, s/he must read the InfoCert's Code of Ethics and Netiquette.

5.4 Audit Logging Procedures

Events related to TSA management, certificate life, and time source events are collected in the control journal as required by the Regulation and Technical Rules.

All events concerning the signature devices customizations are recorded.

All physical accesses to high security zone, in which server is located, are recorded

5.4.1 Types of events recorded

Security events are recorded as well as start up and shut down, system crashes and hardware faults, firewall and router activities and attempts to access the PKI systems.

Event related to TSU keys and certificates are recorded.

All events related to the synchronisation and recalibration of TSU clocks with UTC coordinated universal time are recorded.

Each event is saved with system date and time of the event.

5.4.2 Frequency of Audit Log processing and archiving

Data processing and grouping as well as back-up on the compliant InfoCert storage services of electronic documents are concluded at least monthly.

5.4.3 Retention period for Audit Log

The control journal is kept for at least 20 (twenty) years by the CA.

5.4.4 Protection of Audit Log

Control journal protection is guaranteed by the InfoCert electronic documents Storage System,

compliant with electronic documents storage applicable legislation.

5.4.5 Audit Log backup procedures

The InfoCert Storage Services compliant with electronic documents storage applicable legislation

, implements a back-up policy and procedure, as set out in the manual for these services.

5.4.6 Audit Log collection system

Event logs are collected via automatic custom procedures; back-up occurs in the manner provided for by the InfoCert Storage Services compliant with electronic documents storage applicable legislation, and described in the security manual for these services.

5.4.7 Notification in the event of vulnerability

n/a

5.4.8 Vulnerability assessments

InfoCert periodically carries out vulnerability assessments and penetration tests on the System. Based on the results, it implements all the counter-measures to ensure applications are secure.

5.5 Records Archival

5.5.1 Types of records archived

Reports related to the most important events of a Certification Authority are drafted and stored. Reports are stored at least for 20 years by the Certification Authority in the InfoCert Storage Services compliant with electronic documents storage applicable legislation.

5.5.2 Protection of archives

Protection is guaranteed by the InfoCert Storage Services compliant with electronic documents storage applicable legislation.

5.5.3 Archive backup procedures

InfoCert Storage Services compliant with electronic documents storage applicable legislation, implements a back-up policy and procedure, as set out in the security manual for the above mentioned services.

5.5.4 Archive collection system

n/a

5.5.5 Archive back-up system

Reports are collected via automatic custom procedures; back-up occurs in the manner provided for by the InfoCert compliant storage service and described in the security manual for the above

mentioned services.

5.5.6 Procedures to obtain and verify the information archived

The data are all stored in the compliant InfoCert's Electronic Document Retention Services , which provide for timely checks on system status and data integrity. Data storage is performed in accordance with the standard.

5.6 Key Changeover

Each pair of keys used for time stamping is uniquely associated with the system providing the service. Time stamp keys (TSU keys) are replaced every six months before the expiration of the certificate without revoking the previous one.

5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery

5.7.1 Incident handling procedures

The TSP has described the accident management procedures under ISO 27000 certified SGSI. Any accident, as soon as it is reported, is subject to strict analysis, identification of corrective counter-measures and reported by the service manager. The report is digitally signed and sent to the the compliant InfoCert's Electronic Document Retention Services ; a copy is also sent to the AgID, together with the declaration of actions to be taken aimed at eliminating the causes that may have given rise to the accident, if under the control of InfoCert, as set forth in article 19 of the eIDAS Regulation.

5.7.2 Computing resources, software and/or data are corrupted

In the event of HSM signature security device fault containing the certification keys, the spare copy of the certification key is used, suitably stored and kept, and there is no need to revoke the corresponding TSA certificate.

Software and data are subject to regular back-ups as provided by internal procedures.

5.7.3 TSA private key compromise procedures

A compromised certification key is considered a particularly serious event as it would invalidate the issued certificates and the revocation status information signed using that key. Particular focus is, therefore, placed on protecting the certification key and all the system's development and maintenance activities that can have an impact on it.

Despite being a rare event, InfoCert has prepared a detailed procedure to be followed under the ISO 27001 certified SGSI, giving evidence to the CAB.

Once the TSA private key has been compromised, InfoCert will proceed promptly to:

- inform AgID, the Italian Supervisory Body, for the removal of the key from the TSL and the CAB,
- notify customers through direct communication, where possible, and through

- communication on the InfoCert website,
- shut down the service with the compromised key and revoke the impacted certificates, possibly to proceed with the issuance and accreditation of a new TSA root and to reliably provide information on the revocation status of the certificates.

InfoCert described the procedure to be followed in the event of compromised key, under the ISO 27000 certified SGSI, also informing the AgID and CAB.

5.7.4 CA continuity capabilities after a disaster

InfoCert has adopted the necessary procedures to ensure service continuity even in extremely difficult or disastrous situations.

5.8 Time stamp service termination

In the event the time stamp service is terminated, InfoCert will communicate its intention to the Supervisory Body (AgID) and to the Conformity Assessment Body (CAB) at least 3 (three) months in advance, indicating, if necessary, the certificates and relevant documents register holder.

In the event of TSA termination, information on the revocation status will be provided by issuing the latest CRL.

More details can be found in the TSP Termination Plan document of the Digital Certification and Time Stamping and Qualified Electronic Signature Validation Services available at InfoCert.

6 TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS

6.1 TSU Key Pair Generation and Installation

The time stamp is signed with an asymmetric algorithm from a private key stored on a secure hardware device and the corresponding public key certified by an InfoCert Certification Authority dedicated to this service (TSA).

The pair of asymmetric keys is generated within a hardware encryption device (HSM) compliant with the security requirements provided by ETSI319421 [26].

The TSU asymmetric key pair generation devices can only be activated by authorised operators, working in pairs, who unlock the encryption device by inserting a pair of smart cards accompanied by the PIN.

Private keys are generated and stored in encryption devices so as to prevent them from being exported.

6.1.1 Key algorithm and length

The pair of asymmetrical certification keys is generated inside the hardware encryption device mentioned above.

The TSA root keys can be

- asymmetric RSA keys with a length of not less than 4096 bits;
- EC asymmetric keys on one of the elliptic curves provided by ETSI TS 119 312 – Cryptographic Suites document with length not less than 256 bits.

The Subject keys can be

- asymmetric RSA keys with a length of not less than 2048 bits;
- EC asymmetric keys on one of the elliptic curves provided by ETSI TS 119 312 – Cryptographic Suites document with length not less than 256 bits.

6.1.2 Public key quality controls and generation

The devices used are certified according to high security standards (see § 6.2.1) and ensure that the public key is correct and random. The CA, before issuing the certificate, verifies that the public key has not been used yet.

6.2 Private key protection and encryption module engineering controls

6.2.1 Encryption module controls and standards

The encryption modules used by InfoCert for certification keys (TSAs) are FIPS 140 Level 3 and Common Criteria (CC) Information Technology Security Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) EAL 4 validated in Europe.

6.2.2 TSA private key multi-person control

Access to the devices containing the certification keys only takes place with two people authenticated at the same time.

6.2.3 TSA private key back-up

The back-up of the keys is contained in a safe which can only be accessed by personnel not permitted to access the HSM devices. Any restore, therefore, requires both those staff members who have access to the devices and those who have access to the safe.

6.2.4 Private key back-up on encryption module

The certification key is generated and backed-up in a protected area of the encryption device that inhibits its exportation. Furthermore, the device's operating system, in the event of its protection being forced, blocks the device or makes it illegible.

6.2.5 Private key activation method

The time stamp service can only be activated by authorised operators using a series of passwords and having a number of personal encryption devices.

Once activated, the system does not need additional interactive login procedures except to stop it and reactivate it for maintenance purposes.

6.2.6 TSA private key method of destroying TSA private key

InfoCert personnel assigned to this role deals with the destruction of the private key when the certificate has expired or has been revoked, according to the security procedures provided for by the security policies and device manufacturer's specifications.

6.3 Computer security controls

N/A.

6.3.1 Public key archival

N/A

6.3.2 Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

A certificate validity period shall be determined based on:

- The state of technology;
- The state of the art for cryptographic technologies;
- The intended use of the certificate.

Validity periods are stated on each certificate in the "Validity" field by the

"Not Before" and "Not After" attributes. Outside this date range (including hours, minutes and seconds) a certificate shall be considered invalid.

Currently, the TSA certificate has a duration of no more than 16 (sixteen) years. Time stamping certificates are valid for no more than 60 (sixty) months, if compatible with the strength of the algorithms used.

The key pair of the time stamping certificates installed in the TSU is replaced with the frequency indicated in par. 4.7.

6.4 Computer security controls

6.4.1 Specific computer security requirements

The computer operating system used in certification activities for key generation, certificate generation and certificate register management are secured (hardening), that is, they are configured in order to minimise the impact of any vulnerability by eliminating all the functions that are of no use for the operation and management of the CA.

System administrators, specifically appointed in compliance with current legislation, login via an on-demand root application that only allows root user privileges to be used upon individual authentication. Accesses are tracked, logged and stored for 12 (twelve) months.

6.5 Life Cycle Security Controls

InfoCert considers secure information processing to be strategically important and recognises the need to constantly develop, maintain, control and improve an Information Security Management System (SGSI) in compliance with ISO/IEC 27001.

InfoCert has been ISO/IEC 27001:2005 certified since March 2011 for EA:33-35 activities. In March 2015, the company was certified according to the new version of the ISO/IEC 27001:2013 standard and has recently obtained ISO/IEC 27001:2022 certification.

Procedures and controls are provided in SGSI for:

- Asset Management;
- Access Control;
- Physical and Environmental Safety;
- Operation Activities Security
- Communications Security;
- System Acquisition, Development and Maintenance;
- Accident Management;
- Operational Continuity.

All the procedures are approved by the relative managers and shared internally in the InfoCert document management system.

6.6 Network Security Controls

InfoCert created a network security infrastructure for the certification service, based on the use of firewall mechanisms and SSL protocol in order to create a secure channel between the Registration Offices and the certification system, as well as between this and the administrators/operators.

InfoCert's systems and networks are connected to the Internet in a controlled manner by a firewall system that allows for the connection to be split into gradually more secure areas: Internet network, DMZ (Demilitarised Zone) or Perimeter networks and Internal Networks. All the traffic that flows between the various areas is subject to acceptance by the firewall, based on a set of established rules. The rules defined on the firewalls are designed on the basis of "default deny" principles (what is not expressly permitted is forbidden by default, that is, the rules will only permit what is strictly necessary for the correct functioning of the application) and "defence in depth" (further levels of defence are organised, firstly at network level, via successive firewall barriers, and lastly the hardening at system level).

7 CERTIFICATE, CRL AND OCSP PROFILES

7.1. Time stamping certificate and time stamping profile

The information indicated in the certification request appears in the certificate.

The produced certificate format complies with eIDAS Regulation and AgID Resolution n. 147/2019 [12]; this way full readability and verifiability is guaranteed in the context of the standards and European certifiers.

InfoCert uses the ITU X.509 version 3 standard for the entire PKI structure.

The timestamp format and the TSA communication protocol comply with the technical specifications required in ETSI 319 422 [27].

7.1.1 Version number

All the certificates issued by InfoCert are X.509 version 3.

7.1.2 Certificate extensions

Qualified certificates are characterised by the extension found in the qcStatement clause 3.2.6 of IETF RFC 3739. Their use is governed by ETSI 319 412-2 and ETSI 319 422 standards.

7.1.3 Signature algorithm OID

The time stamp subscription and time stamp certificate algorithm can be chosen from the following:

sha256WithRSAEncryption [iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)

pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) sha256WithRSAEncryption(11)]

ecdsa-with-SHA256 [iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x962(10045)

signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) ecdsa-with-SHA256(2)]

ecdsa-with-SHA384 [iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x962(10045) signatures(4)
ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) ecdsa-with-SHA384(3)]

ecdsa-with-SHA512 [iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x962(10045) signatures(4)
ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) ecdsa-with-SHA512(4)].

7.1.4 Name forms

Each certificate contains an univocal serial number inside the TSA that issued it.

7.1.5 Name restrictions

See paragraph 3.1.

7.1.6 Certificate OID

See paragraph 1.2.

7.1.7 Time stamp format and content

The time stamp format and the TSA communication protocol comply with the technical specifications required in ETSI319422 [27]. Each time stamp issued contains all the information required by law, namely:

- The time stamp issuer's identification;
- The time stamp serial number;
- The certificate identification for the TSU public key;
- The time stamp generation date and time;
- The accuracy of the time source with respect to UTC. In this case it is a second or better;
- The identification of the hash algorithm used to generate the imprint of computer evidence submitted to time stamping. In this case, the algorithm used is SHA-256 (secure hash algorithm 256-bit OID: 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1);
- The value of the computer evidence imprint.

7.2 CRL profile

To create the lists of revoked CRLs, InfoCert uses the RFC5280 profile "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Revocation List (CRL)" and adds extensions as defined by RFC 5280 to the basic format: "Authority Key Identifier", "CRL Number ", " Issuing Distribution Point "and" expiredCertsOnCRL ".

7.2.1 Version number

All the certificates issued by InfoCert are X.509 version 2.

7.3 OCSP profile

In order to be able to establish the certificate revocation status without making a request to the CRL, InfoCert makes OCSP services available that comply with the RFC6960 profile "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure On-line Certificate Status Protocol – OCSP". This protocol specifies the data that needs to be exchanged by an application that wishes to check the certificate status and OCSP service.

7.3.1 Version number

The OCSP protocol used by InfoCert complies with version 1 of the RFC6960.

8 COMPLIANCE AUDITS AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS

In order to obtain the qualification of qualified and unqualified trust service provider, in compliance with the eIDAS Regulation, it is essential to complete the process provided for under article 21 of the above mentioned Regulations.

InfoCert presented the specific request to AgID to obtain recognition as “qualified trust service provider” enclosing a conformity assessment report to the Regulation (Conformity Assessment Report - CAR) issued by an assessment body authorised by the national appointed body (CAB), which in Italy is ACCREDIA.

8.1 Frequency and circumstances of conformity assessment

The conformity assessment is repeated every two years, but every year the CAB carries out a surveillance audit.

8.2 Identity/qualifications of assessor

Assessments are performed by

| | |
|---------------------------------|--|
| <i>Company name</i> | CSQA Certificazioni S.r.l. |
| <i>Telephone number</i> | Via S. Gaetano n. 74, 36016 Thiene (VI) |
| <i>Business Register Number</i> | +39 0445 313011 |
| | Tax Identification Number 02603680246 |
| | Business Register no. 02603680246 |
| | REA no. 258305 |
| <i>VAT Code</i> | 02603680246 |
| <i>Website</i> | https://www.csqa.it |

8.3 CAB's relationship to InfoCert

The service is provided by InfoCert as a qualified trust service provider within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No. 910/2014 of 23/07/2014, on the basis of a conformity assessment carried out by the Conformity Assessment Body CSQA Certificazioni S.r.l. pursuant to the above Regulation and to the ETSI EN 319 401 standard, and according to the eIDAS assessment scheme defined by ACCREDIA in accordance with the ETSI EN 319_403 and UNI CEI EN ISO/IEC 17065:2012 standards.

8.4 Topics covered by assessment

The CAB is called upon to assess conformity with the CPS, the Guidelines and applicable standards of the procedures adopted, CA organisation, role organisation, staff training and contractual documents.

8.5 Actions taken as a result of non conformity

In the event of non-compliance, the CAB will decide whether to send a report to the AgID or reserve the right to carry out another audit after the non-compliance has been rectified.

InfoCert aims to deal with all non-compliance aspects as quickly as possible, setting in motion all the actions required for improvement and adaptation.

9 OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS

9.1 Fees

9.1.1 Time stamp issue fees

The fees are available from these sites <https://www.firma.infocert.it/> and

<http://ecommerce.infocert.it>. The CA may enter into commercial agreements with specific fees.

9.1.2 Time stamp verification fees

Time stamp verification is free.

9.1.3 Fees for other services

The fees are available from these sites <https://www.firma.infocert.it/> and <http://ecommerce.infocert.it>. The CA may enter into commercial agreements with specific fees.

9.1.4 Refund policy

If the service is purchased by a person who can be legally classified as a consumer, the latter has the right to terminate the agreement within 14 days from the date of its conclusion and to obtain refund of the paid price. Instructions for exercising the right of withdrawal and claim reimbursement are available at <https://help.infocert.it/>.

9.2 Financial Responsibility

9.2.1 Insurance coverage

The TSP InfoCert has entered into a suitable insurance policy to cover operational risks and damage to third parties, as required by AgID Determination No. 185/2017. The following ceilings apply:

- 10.000.000 Euro for a single accident;
- 10.000.000 Euro per year.

9.2.2 Warranty and insurance cover for end subject s

See paragraph 9.2.1.

9.3 Confidentiality of Business Information

9.3.1 Area of application of confidential information

Confidential information management is not part of the activities mentioned in this Manual.

9.4 Privacy of Personal Information

Unless expressly permitted, any Subject's/Subscriber's information acquired by the CA while performing its routine activities shall be regarded as confidential and non-disclosable, except for information specifically intended for public use [e.g. public key, certificates, (if requested by the Subject, certificate revocation and suspension dates)]. In particular, personal data shall be processed by the Certification Authority in accordance with CAD, Legislative Decree No. 196 of 30 June 2003[4] and with European Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal

data and on the free movement of such data, fully binding starting from 25 May 2018 [4].

9.4.1 Privacy plan

InfoCert adopts a set of policies through which it implements and integrates personal data protection within its ISO 27001 certified Information Security Management System, sharing the continuous improvement process with this system.

9.4.2 Information treated as private

Data that falls under the corresponding definition found in the current law [4] is considered personal; personal data refers to any information regarding the physical person, identified or identifiable, even indirectly, via reference to any other information, including a personal identification number.

9.4.3 Controller of the processing of personal data

| | |
|--------------------------|---|
| <i>Company name</i> | InfoCert S.p.A |
| <i>Registered office</i> | Piazza Sallustio n. 9 |
| | 00147 Roma |
| <i>Email</i> | richieste.privacy@legalmail.it |

9.4.4 Privacy information and personal data processing consent

The privacy disclosure is available on the website <https://www.infocert.it> at the following link <https://www.infocert.it/informative-privacy>.

InfoCert will process personal data in accordance with the law. Such processing will be based on an appropriate legal basis, as described in the privacy notice.

In cases where identification requires the processing of biometric data, InfoCert will request consent before providing the service.

If processing is carried out by a third party on behalf of InfoCert, the privacy notice will be made available by that third party, which will also collect consent if required.

9.4.5 Data disclosure following requests from the authorities

Data disclosure on request from the Authorities is obligatory and follows the instructions established by the Authorities themselves case by case.

9.4.6 Other disclosure reasons

Not foreseen.

9.5 Intellectual Property Rights

The copyright in this document belongs to InfoCert SpA. All rights reserved.

9.6 Representations and Warranties

InfoCert retains responsibility for complying with the procedures prescribed in its information security policy, including when certain functions are delegated to a third party.

The Client or the Subscriber is responsible for the truthfulness of the data communicated to the Certification Authority. The Client or the Subscriber is also obliged to let know as well as to obtain acceptance of the general time stamp validation service conditions and of the present Practice statement by all the subjects that use the service.

9.7 Warranty limitation Disclaimers of Warrantird

InfoCert does not provide any warranties on (i) the proper operativity and safety of hardware and software used by the Subscriber; (ii) the use of time stamp different from those provided by current regulations and this Practice Statement; (iii) the continuity of national and/or international electricity and telephone lines; (iv) the validity and relevance, including probatory, of the any message, deed or document associated with the time stamp.

InfoCert only guarantees the operating of the Service, according to the levels specified in paragraph 9.18 of the present Practice Statement.

9.8 Limitation of Liability

The service is provided in accordance to the contract for the Time Stamp Services (hereinafter also the referred to as the "Contract"). InfoCert does not carry out any verification of the document for which the Time Stamp is requested, as such determinations and information are known and sent directly by the Subscriber under his own and exclusive liability.

InfoCert does not undertake any obligation to monitor the content, the type or the electronic format of the documents and possibly of the hash sent by the IT procedure indicated by the Subscriber or the Owner, so not having liability, unless wilful misconduct or negligence with reference to the validity and imputability of them to the actual intention of the Subscriber.

Except in case of wilful misconduct or gross negligence, InfoCert shall not be liable for any direct or indirect damage suffered by the Owners and/or by third parties because of the use or non-use of the time stamp certificates issued in accordance with the provisions of this Statement and the General Conditions of the Time Stamp Services.

InfoCert is not responsible for any direct and/or indirect damage deriving, also alternatively, from: i) loss, ii) improper storage, iii) improper use of time stamp tools and/or failure of the Subscriber in complying with the recommendations mentioned above.

Moreover, also from the phase of formation of the Contract as well as during its execution, InfoCert is not liable for any damages and/or delays due to malfunctioning or arrest of the computer system and internet.

Except in the case of wilful misconduct or gross negligence, InfoCert shall not be burdened with

charges or liability for direct or indirect damages of any nature or importance that may occur to the Subscriber and/or to third parties caused by third parties unauthorized by InfoCert tampering or interfering with the service or equipment.

9.9 Indemnities

InfoCert is solely responsible for possible damages directly determined, intentionally or by negligence, to any natural or legal person, as a result of failure to comply with the obligations set out in Regulation (EU) No. 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 and by InfoCert's failure to use all the appropriate measures to avoid the damage.

In such case the Subscriber or the Owner will have the right to obtain, as compensation for the damages directly suffered as a result of the behavior referred to in the previous paragraph, an amount that can not in any case exceed the maximum values envisaged, for each claim and per year, by art. 3, c. 7, of the Regulation attached to the Determination 185/2017.

The refund may not be requested if the failure to use the service is due to the misuse of the certification service or to the telecommunication network operator or to incidental events, force majeure or causes not attributable to InfoCert such as, for example, strikes, revolts, earthquakes, acts of terrorism, popular riots, organised sabotage, chemical and/or bacteriological events, war, floods, measures put in place by competent authorities or to inadequacy of structures, hardware and/or software used by the Subscriber.

9.10 Term and termination

9.10.1 Term

This CPS remains in effect until otherwise communicated by InfoCert on its website.

9.10.2 Termination

The Contract automatically terminates according to law, with consequent interruption of the Service and revocation of time stamp credentials, in cases of non-compliance with the clauses indicated in the service supply contract. Termination will occur according to law, if the interested party communicates to the other party via PEC or registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt to make use of the present clause.

The effects produced by the Contract shall remain unaffected until its termination.

The Holder acknowledges that in the event of termination of the Contract, for any reason whatsoever, it will no longer be possible to use the Service.

9.10.3 Effects of termination

Termination implies the immediate impossibility of using the time stamping service.

9.11 Individual notices and communications with participants

Please consult the contact channels found in paragraph 1.5.

9.12 Amendments

The CA reserves the right to make changes to this document for technical purposes as well as changes to procedures required due to both laws or regulations and to maximise the work cycle. Each new version of the CPS voids and replaces the previous versions that remain, however, applicable to certificates issued during their validity and up until their first expiry date.

Variations that have not had a significant impact on Relying Partys leads to the increase in the document release number, while variations with a significant impact on Relying Partys (such as, for example, changes regarding operating procedures) lead to an increase in the document version number. In any case, the manual will be immediately published and made available following the methods provided. Any technical or procedural change to this document shall be immediately communicated to the RA.

If the changes are relevant, the CA must undergo an audit by an accredited CAB, submit the certification report (*CAR – Conformity Assessment Report*) and the CPS to the Supervisory Bodies (AgID) and wait for permission to publish.

9.12.1 Amendment history

| Information | Description |
|-------------------------|---|
| Version/Release: | 2.11 |
| Version/Release date | 22/05/2025 |
| Description of changes: | Update of Logo and Operational and Legal Office – Rome Update of DR Site and Removal of Figure 1 InfoCert Phone Contact Update Update of eIDAS Regulation Reference General Review of Document Styles and Formats Update of ISO 27001 and 9001 Versions § 9.2.1 Clarifications on Insurance Coverage § 9.4.4 Clarifications on Privacy Notice and Consent for Personal Data Processing |
| Reasons: | General document review, accessibility, updates, and corrections |

Table 5 – Version 2.11

| Information | Description |
|----------------------|---|
| Version/Release: | 2.10 |
| Version/Release date | 15/05/2024 |
| Change description: | §§ 1.1 e 1.2: New policy and clarification on the scope of application of the policies § 1.3.1: Review of company data § 1.5.1: Deleted fax from contacts and contact update § 1.5.2, 9.10.2: Update of company business unit names § 4.10.1: Clarification on the OCSP service § 5.1.1: Review of description § 5.1.3: Updated certification of the website § 5.1.7 e 5.1.8: Review of description § 6.3: Specifics on the validity period of the certificate and keys § 7.1: Clarification on the format of the timestamp § 7.1.3: Specification of the timestamp certificate signing algorithm § 8.3: Review of description § 9.4: Clarifications § 9.10.2: Review of description General revision with spelling and grammatical corrections, reformulations and |

| Information | Description |
|-------------|---|
| | clarifications |
| Reasons: | General review New policy for qualified timestamp service with EC key stamp certificates |

Table 6 – Version 2.10

| Information | Description |
|----------------------|--|
| Version/Release: | 2.9 |
| Version/Release date | 18/04/2023 |
| Change description: | InfoCert logo update §§ 1.2, 7.1, 9.15 Added reference to AgID Determination 147/2019 § 4.3 Description of the synchronization system §§ 5.1.1, 5.1.3, 5.1.5 Review of facility aspects § 5.4.2 Description review § 5.8 Modification of notice periods in case of termination §§ 6.1.1, 7.1.3 Algorithms and keys review § Appendix A Added new InfoCert Time Stamping Authority EC 4 and InfoCert Basic Time Stamping Authority 3 roots |
| Reasons: | General review Rebranding |

Table 7 – Version 2.9

| Information | Description |
|----------------------|--|
| Version/Release: | 2.8 |
| Version/Release date | 13/05/2022 |
| Change description: | § 5 Added detail on frequency of security policy review §§ 5.4.2, 5.4.3, 5.4.4, 5.4.5, 5.4.6, 5.5.1, 5.5.2, 5.5.3, 5.5.5, 5.5.6, 5.5.7 Specification of storage methods § 5.5.6 Update of detail of the procedure Formatting for document accessibility |
| Reasons: | General review Edit formatting |

Table 8 – Version 2.8

| Information | Description |
|----------------------|--|
| Version/Release: | 2.7 |
| Version/Release date | 16/09/2021 |
| Change description: | § 1.5.1: change of contact information |
| Reasons: | Contact information update |

Table 9 – Version 2.7

| Information | Description |
|----------------------|--|
| Version/Release: | 2.6 |
| Version/Release date | 15/06/2021 |
| Change description: | Change to the title of the document with the addition of the not qualified timestamp service § 1.1: Addition of the not qualified service § 1.2: Added not qualified policies and revised description § 1.4.1: Change of name of verification software § 5.3.5: Update description of work shifts § 5.8: Description review § 4.9: Clarification regarding information on the revocation status § 5.1.1: Technological update § 5.7.3: Description update § Annex A: Added annex with TSA root certificates Spelling corrections |
| Reasons: | New roots Periodic review |

Table 10 – Version 2.6

| Information | Description |
|------------------|-------------|
| Version/Release: | 2.5 |

| Information | Description |
|----------------------|---|
| Version/Release date | 22/05/2020 |
| Change description: | § 5.1.1 Technological update § 5.1.6 Technological updating of storage media |
| Reasons: | Technological update |

Table 11 – Version 2.5

| Information | Description |
|----------------------|---|
| Version/Release: | 2.4 |
| Version/Release date | 03/12/2019 |
| Change description: | § 1.2 OID AgIDcert introduction § 5.1.1 Datacenter location § 5.3.7 physical and logical access § 5.4.1 added physical and logical log description dia |
| Reasons: | Typo correction Agid Resolution n. 121/2019 come into effect |

Table 12 – Version 2.4

| Information | Description |
|----------------------|--|
| Version/Release: | 2.3 |
| Version/Release date | 30/11/2018 |
| Change description: | § 1.3 Group named changed in "tinexta" |
| Reasons: | Name of the group changed |

Table 13 – Version 2.3

| Information | Description |
|----------------------|---|
| Version/Release: | 2.2 |
| Version/Release date | 19/06/2018 |
| Change description: | § 1.5, § 9.2, § 9.4, § 9.15 New phone contacts, Insurance cover, privacy, Typo correction, document code |
| Reasons: | |

Table 14 – Version 2.2

| Information | Description |
|----------------------|--|
| Version/Release: | 2.1 |
| Version/Release date | 09/04/2018 |
| Change description: | Typo correction § 9.6, § 9.7, § 9.8, § 9.9, § 9.10 rewriting of these par. for a better contextualization |
| Reasons: | |

Table 15 – Version 2.1

| Information | Description |
|----------------------|---|
| Version/Release: | 2.0.1 |
| Version/Release date | 28/07/2017 |
| Change description: | Corrected minus mistakes in § 4.3 and § 4.7 |
| Reasons: | |

Table 16 – Version 2.0.1

| Information | Description |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Version/Release: | 2.0 |
| Version/Release date | 02/05/2017 |
| Change description: | Relocated content on RFC 3647 index |
| Reasons: | |

Table 17 – Version 2.0

| Information | Description |
|----------------------|-------------------|
| Version/Release: | 1.0 |
| Version/Release date | 01/07/2016 |
| Change description: | First issue |

| Information | Description |
|-------------|-------------|
| Reasons: | |

Table 18 – Version 1.0

9.12.2 Procedure for amendment

The certificate practice statement revision procedures are the same as the drafting procedures. This revisions are made jointly with the Head of Certification Service, the Head of Security, the Privacy Officer, the Head of Certification Services, the Head of Legal Department, the Head of Regulatory Affairs and are approved by Corporate Management.

9.12.3 Notification mechanism and period

The CPS is published:

- in electronic format on the TSP website (via link <http://www.firma.infocert.it/doc/manuali.htm>) or on the CA website (<https://www.firma.infocert.it>)
- in electronic format in the public list of certifiers held by AgID.

9.13 Dispute Resolution Provisions

For a detailed description of dispute resolution provisions, please refer to the contracts governing the service.

9.14 Governing Law

For a detailed description of Competent court, please refer to the contracts governing the service.

9.15 Compliance with Applicable Law

The law governing this document is Italian law.

The following is a complete list of the main applicable reference laws:

- [1] Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 2024/1183 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 (referred to as eIDAS).
- [2] Italian Legislative Decree no. 82 dated 7 March 2005, (OJ no. 112 of 16 May 2005) – Digital administration Code (also referred to as CAD) as amended.
- [3] *not used*
- [4] Italian Legislative Decree no. 196 of 30 June 2003, (OJ no. 174 of 29 July 2003) – Privacy Code as amended and regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (in force starting from 25 Mai 2018).
- [5] *not used*
- [6] *not used*
- [7] Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights and related national transposing legislation.
- [8] Preliminary verification – 24 September 2015 [4367555] Processing personal data in the contex of the 'Emission process by webcam recognition' for qualified or digital electronic signature.
- [9] CNIPA ("The National Centre for IT in the Public Administration") Decision no. 45 of 21

- May 2009, as amended by subsequent resolutions.
- [10] Resolution AgID no. 189/2017
- [11] Furthermore, all the circulars and resolutions from the Supervisory Authorities¹, as well as the implementation acts provided for under the eIDAS Regulation [1] apply.
- [12] AgID Resolution n.121/2019 ver 1.1 (in place of CNIPA Resolution 45/2009) and the amendments of the subsequent AgID Resolution n. 147/2019.

9.16 Reference standards

Below is a non-exhaustive list of reference standards applicable to the service:

- i. ETSI EN 319 401 V2.1.1 - ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES AND INFRASTRUCTURES (ESI); GENERAL POLICY REQUIREMENTS FOR TRUST SERVICE PROVIDERS;
- ii. ETSI EN 319 421 V1.1.1 -ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES AND INFRASTRUCTURES (ESI); POLICY AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR TRUST SERVICE PROVIDERS ISSUING TIME-STAMPS, hereinafter ETSI319421;
- iii. ETSI EN 319 422 V1.1.1 (2016-03) ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES AND INFRASTRUCTURES (ESI); TIME-STAMPING PROTOCOL AND TIME-STAMP TOKEN PROFILES, hereinafter ETSI319422.

9.17 Miscellaneous provisions

Please consult the contract governing the service for any other regulation not found in this Manual.

9.18 Other provisions

Service provision times (unless otherwise agreed in the contract) are as follows:

| <i>Service</i> | <i>Times</i> |
|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| Time stamp request | From 0:00 to 24:00 24/7 |
| Time stamp verification | From 0:00 to 24:00 24/7 |

Table 19 – Service provision times

¹ Available on website <http://www.agid.gov.it/agenda-digitale/infrastrutture-architetture/firme-elettroniche>

ANNEX A

Time stamp root "InfoCert Time Stamping Authority 2"

```

0 1266: SEQUENCE {
4 986: SEQUENCE {
8 3: [0] {
10 1: INTEGER 2
: }
13 1: INTEGER 3
16 13: SEQUENCE {
18 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
29 0: NULL
: }
31 117: SEQUENCE {
33 11: SET {
35 9: SEQUENCE {
37 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
42 2: PrintableString 'IT'
: }
: }
46 21: SET {
48 19: SEQUENCE {
50 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
55 12: UTF8String 'INFOCERT SPA'
: }
: }
69 12: SET {
71 10: SEQUENCE {
73 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11)
78 3: UTF8String 'TSA'
: }
: }
83 20: SET {
85 18: SEQUENCE {
87 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
92 11: PrintableString '07945211006'
: }
: }
105 43: SET {
107 41: SEQUENCE {
109 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
114 34: UTF8String 'InfoCert Time Stamping Authority 2'
: }
: }
: }
150 30: SEQUENCE {
152 13: UTCTime 19/04/2013 14:30:33 GMT
167 13: UTCTime 19/04/2029 15:30:33 GMT
: }
182 117: SEQUENCE {
184 11: SET {
186 9: SEQUENCE {
188 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
193 2: PrintableString 'IT'
: }
: }
197 21: SET {
199 19: SEQUENCE {
201 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)

```

```

206 12:    UTF8String 'INFOCERT SPA'
      :    }
      :    }
220 12:    SET {
222 10:    SEQUENCE {
224 3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11)
229 3:      UTF8String 'TSA'
      :    }
      :    }
234 20:    SET {
236 18:    SEQUENCE {
238 3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
243 11:    PrintableString '07945211006'
      :    }
      :    }
256 43:    SET {
258 41:    SEQUENCE {
260 3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
265 34:    UTF8String 'InfoCert Time Stamping Authority 2'
      :    }
      :    }
      :    }
301 290:   SEQUENCE {
305 13:    SEQUENCE {
307 9:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
318 0:      NULL
      :    }
320 271:    BIT STRING, encapsulates {
325 266:    SEQUENCE {
329 257:    INTEGER
      :      00 C1 82 81 37 2D 2F 2A A4 48 26 15 AE 06 D6 87
      :      E2 45 EA 4C 39 0C 4B 6C 35 DE AB 35 8C B8 74 3C
      :      67 BE 75 28 7F 94 1A 48 20 A0 1F 33 14 88 FA D3
      :      8A 65 9A 8B CC 53 A2 AC F3 E3 69 D4 AC 7F 67 D6
      :      77 33 90 36 5E F9 87 30 4D 6E 5C F9 A9 F0 AB 8D
      :      86 91 17 B7 82 0B 34 EE E7 8C CD 6F CB FF 84 DC
      :      CF 74 EA B0 E1 1C 60 86 CF 51 15 9C 87 96 45 FB
      :      54 28 14 C6 8E F3 B1 CE C4 2C BD 0B 81 A0 D9 64
      :      2A 11 79 0A FE 81 89 ED 0C 9C 7E 4C ED EE BA 8B
      :      C5 07 FC CE B2 C6 B0 C6 13 67 C3 EE 08 87 F8 99
      :      F9 80 3A 54 14 A1 18 D8 C9 3F 9A 1B 7F 82 C7 F0
      :      7D 33 3B F9 25 54 FB 36 14 40 0B C2 B2 0E BE 7D
      :      55 82 96 AE 71 D5 8B 88 E4 F6 3D 5C 2B 87 EC 6E
      :      72 4D BD F4 7D 57 BC C1 6A EF D1 E6 95 05 F3 CA
      :      4A CF 17 64 2C 0B 5C AD AF 26 F3 46 D2 C8 1F 20
      :      5B 9C 48 96 80 F2 2C FB A1 8E 8B 56 C7 DF 62 99
      :      3F
590 3:    INTEGER 65537
      :    }
      :    }
      :    }
595 395:   [3] {
599 391:    SEQUENCE {
603 15:    SEQUENCE {
605 3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
610 1:      BOOLEAN TRUE
613 5:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
615 3:      SEQUENCE {
617 1:      BOOLEAN TRUE
      :    }
      :    }
      :    }
620 88:    SEQUENCE {
622 3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32)
627 81:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {

```

```

629 79: SEQUENCE {
631 77: SEQUENCE {
633 4: OBJECT IDENTIFIER anyPolicy (2 5 29 32 0)
639 69: SEQUENCE {
641 67: SEQUENCE {
643 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cps (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 2 1)
653 55: IA5String
: 'http://www.firma.infocert.it/documentazione/manu'
: 'ali.php'
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
710 37: SEQUENCE {
712 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER issuerAltName (2 5 29 18)
717 30: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
719 28: SEQUENCE {
721 26: [1] 'firma.digitale@infocert.it'
: }
: }
: }
749 195: SEQUENCE {
752 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
757 187: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
760 184: SEQUENCE {
763 181: SEQUENCE {
766 178: [0] {
769 175: [0] {
772 40: [6] 'http://crl.infocert.it/crls/tss2/ARL.crl'
814 130: [6]
: 'ldap://ldap.infocert.it/cn%3DInfoCert%20Time%20S'
: 'tamping%20Authority%202,ou%3D TSA,o%3D INFOCERT%20'
: 'SPA,C%3DIT?authorityRevocationList'
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
947 14: SEQUENCE {
949 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
954 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
957 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
959 2: BIT STRING 1 unused bit
: '1100000'B
: }
: }
963 29: SEQUENCE {
965 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
970 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
972 20: OCTET STRING
: 07 36 16 18 B5 0E FD 77 8F 5D 68 25 F2 38 FD 6F
: 34 26 F5 F7
: }
: }
: }
: }
994 13: SEQUENCE {
996 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
1007 0: NULL
: }
1009 257: BIT STRING

```

```

: 4E CB 99 48 10 A8 8F 80 68 80 D4 C5 FE EE F7 E0
: 42 3E 65 AB B8 A7 84 18 F5 B1 7B 2B 66 C7 E7 6C
: 60 0F E1 91 3D D4 7D 25 02 80 5F 1E 36 A6 F0 1E
: 91 54 D9 C2 7F 32 01 80 5B D4 29 57 58 5E 1B BE
: F3 C9 98 B2 55 87 DB 17 CB 4D B9 F0 8F 7C F3 D9
: 34 FF 73 EB EA 14 3D 9E E1 7E 7E 7C 42 08 05 C3
: B0 A8 11 D2 D6 C9 1D 80 59 74 24 A9 0B FC 5B 45
: 4D 1B 4E 6D 27 61 3C E4 42 45 D9 BE FF 28 7E 25
: 0C 65 D4 D8 45 9D 76 5F 09 D5 22 8F 50 5C 84 B3
: A7 3D 78 20 DD 98 1E F1 79 59 A0 A4 C7 36 F2 A9
: B2 F0 3B 2D 9D 4D E1 EB F8 21 7B 9D 60 B0 CF 64
: 21 A2 C7 C3 FA 05 1F AA 7B 08 DA DA 7C 2C 75 63
: 9A 16 83 F1 77 7D 8B B5 E0 85 DB 33 CA B0 22 54
: 46 42 2C E1 86 F2 28 A2 53 3A 99 13 65 66 CA D5
: 47 47 34 88 F8 1C 75 68 EE 65 68 F9 57 38 B2 A1
: 76 BC FD 87 15 37 B4 EB B8 56 A5 BF AF 53 46 48
: }

```

Qualified time stamp root "Qualified InfoCert Time Stamping Authority 2"

```

0 1810: SEQUENCE {
4 1274: SEQUENCE {
8 3: [0] {
10 1: INTEGER 2
: }
13 1: INTEGER 1
16 13: SEQUENCE {
18 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSASignature (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
29 0: NULL
: }
31 127: SEQUENCE {
33 11: SET {
35 9: SEQUENCE {
37 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
42 2: PrintableString 'IT'
: }
: }
46 21: SET {
48 19: SEQUENCE {
50 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
55 12: UTF8String 'INFOCERT SPA'
: }
: }
69 12: SET {
71 10: SEQUENCE {
73 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11)
78 3: UTF8String 'TSA'
: }
: }
83 20: SET {
85 18: SEQUENCE {
87 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
92 11: PrintableString '07945211006'
: }
: }
105 53: SET {
107 51: SEQUENCE {
109 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
114 44: UTF8String
: 'InfoCert Qualified Time Stamping Authority 2'

```

```

:    }
:    }
:    }
160 30: SEQUENCE {
162 13:   UTCTime 28/06/2016 14:18:40 GMT
177 13:   UTCTime 28/06/2026 15:18:40 GMT
:    }
192 127: SEQUENCE {
194 11:   SET {
196 9:    SEQUENCE {
198 3:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
203 2:     PrintableString 'IT'
:    }
:    }
207 21: SET {
209 19:   SEQUENCE {
211 3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
216 12:    UTF8String 'INFOCERT SPA'
:    }
:    }
230 12: SET {
232 10:   SEQUENCE {
234 3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11)
239 3:    UTF8String 'TSA'
:    }
:    }
244 20: SET {
246 18:   SEQUENCE {
248 3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
253 11:    PrintableString '07945211006'
:    }
:    }
266 53: SET {
268 51:   SEQUENCE {
270 3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
275 44:    UTF8String
:    'InfoCert Qualified Time Stamping Authority 2'
:    }
:    }
:    }
321 546: SEQUENCE {
325 13:   SEQUENCE {
327 9:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
338 0:    NULL
:    }
340 527: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
345 522:   SEQUENCE {
349 513:    INTEGER
:    00 9F AB C7 3F 53 A6 89 34 EF 57 D7 FA 95 51 7A
:    13 40 B9 99 25 1C BA 39 6E 8C 70 CD 49 5E 66 D4
:    5D EC 6C 82 2F F7 B2 16 87 D3 ED BF 07 CF 58 5B
:    0C A8 EC 5C 8C CE E9 D6 14 7A 52 F9 72 5F 4B C8
:    16 7E 5C CE 78 06 10 88 0A C8 8C 24 B4 60 A8 2D
:    7D 3D 0A AA 83 50 FA F5 CA 9A 91 C9 56 A6 D8 66
:    61 C9 46 46 89 50 07 2F 52 73 70 8C 54 F8 84 6B
:    C5 19 DC 7B B4 69 3B 6B 37 52 2F E0 F3 5C 8D 06
:    CB F8 E7 7E A6 36 69 27 8C 04 EA 3C CD 2E A7 2D
:    31 7B 6D E8 9D 41 2B DA F4 F9 07 98 31 FB BA B1
:    88 20 17 B7 3F 9A 57 09 3F F6 AD 6C CC 7F 3A 41
:    EE 72 E1 AF E0 8D 74 5F 0F 66 29 21 9C 4F C9 43
:    19 2B 77 4F A7 F7 61 3D 9B 25 B5 E9 33 81 F7 A8
:    1F AD 11 7E 3D E4 E9 44 99 05 13 57 34 B0 A2 45
:    58 FD 8D 0F 37 70 7D C4 BD F3 D7 B6 E5 7C 1C 8F
:    AE 26 2A AF E8 17 CC 46 EC 50 A5 DC 62 59 BA 54
:    2F D9 B3 E1 9F A3 5C D5 CE 80 DE 5D 37 F6 7E BD

```



```

      : E0 8D 2D 9C 3F C0 1E 0F DA B0 23 EE 5D B7 71 11
      : 0C EB 87 E7 2E 48 61 71 FF B5 FE 83 69 DB 4F E2
      : 7D 86 B3 46 A3 11 FD 1E 38 BC 1B 03 70 E1 2A E0
      : 73 BD 05 45 C7 7E 87 BC 46 0F AE BA C7 5E B1 76
      : 08 32 62 1A 7E 8F 6D EE 71 82 CB 3E B6 FA 61 E8
      : 56 21 32 0F 86 58 96 F2 C7 DC 83 6B C7 81 E5 CE
      : 29 CE AA A6 20 63 8F C3 78 A3 F6 5E 8B 41 62 B0
      : A4 CF 49 5B D3 ED EA A0 97 3B D5 D0 82 99 F2 48
      : 39 CE 8B 82 22 B8 DC 78 27 E1 A2 74 14 8E 18 B2
      : E4 F0 CE FA 19 AA 40 A8 0A 44 AC E3 79 F4 99 53
      : 0E C8 23 29 BB 80 71 7D 8B 0E AF B7 B5 A7 17 F7
      : 8A E2 53 19 AC 71 86 0A BE 46 26 FC 22 62 8A A7
      : 4E 08 25 3F D5 19 20 39 1E ED 0B D2 4D 38 8E 1A
      : 15 5B F5 D1 C7 AC BE DE 04 7D D5 8E EE 89 63 51
      : B6 33 FA ED 6A 57 CB 7B B9 F1 38 B2 39 B4 8D CD
      : FF
866 3:  INTEGER 65537
      : }
      : }
      : }
871 407: [3] {
875 403:  SEQUENCE {
879 15:  SEQUENCE {
881 3:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
886 1:  BOOLEAN TRUE
889 5:  OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
891 3:  SEQUENCE {
893 1:  BOOLEAN TRUE
      : }
      : }
      : }
896 88:  SEQUENCE {
898 3:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32)
903 81:  OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
905 79:  SEQUENCE {
907 77:  SEQUENCE {
909 4:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER anyPolicy (2 5 29 32 0)
915 69:  SEQUENCE {
917 67:  SEQUENCE {
919 8:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER cps (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 2 1)
929 55:  IA5String
      : 'http://www.firma.infocert.it/documentazione/manu'
      : 'ali.php'
      : }
      : }
      : }
      : }
      : }
      : }
986 37:  SEQUENCE {
988 3:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER issuerAltName (2 5 29 18)
993 30:  OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
995 28:  SEQUENCE {
997 26:  [1] 'firma.digitale@infocert.it'
      : }
      : }
      : }
1025 207: SEQUENCE {
1028 3:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
1033 199: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
1036 196: SEQUENCE {
1039 193: SEQUENCE {
1042 190: [0] {
1045 187: [0] {
1048 40:  [6] 'http://crl.infocert.it/crls/qtss/ARL.crl'

```

```

1090 142:      [6]
:      'ldap://ldap.infocert.it/cn%3DInfoCert%20Qualifie'
:      'd%20Time%20Stamping%20Authority%202,ou%3D TSA,o%3'
:      'DINFOCERT%20SPA,c%3DIT?authorityRevocationList'
:      }
:      }
:      }
:      }
:      }
:      }
:      }
1235 14:      SEQUENCE {
1237 3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
1242 1:      BOOLEAN TRUE
1245 4:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
1247 2:      BIT STRING 1 unused bit
:      '1100000'B
:      }
:      }
1251 29:      SEQUENCE {
1253 3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
1258 22:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
1260 20:      OCTET STRING
:      AE 92 81 E5 30 55 6D C8 4A 74 78 A1 71 6D 3F 39
:      02 FE 58 87
:      }
:      }
:      }
:      }
:      }
1282 13: SEQUENCE {
1284 9:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
1295 0:  NULL
:      }
1297 513: BIT STRING
:  39 46 9B E9 7A 02 72 D5 F8 11 D4 94 42 80 26 CE
:  2F DD 56 82 92 D5 68 05 14 D2 F0 C8 0C 5B 11 CF
:  88 F0 94 3D 66 B9 B8 52 35 B1 E5 A1 9C 83 2C F3
:  5B 4E AA 2E D8 B1 75 61 E0 FB 96 86 0C EC AB F6
:  2A A8 5B 61 C7 20 46 32 48 75 01 52 23 09 7E 7D
:  88 41 B5 80 0D 0B 0F 8F 63 7F D5 4B 25 58 7A D3
:  4A 5C 1C DA B2 83 5F BF B5 CB 9F 73 08 BD 17 84
:  57 5F 8E 6D 9B 15 6F 21 03 8A 9C 3E 94 03 34 D9
:  A4 08 62 08 03 39 38 9B F6 1B C6 D3 FB 1D BD DE
:  23 E9 FA F5 62 73 2E EC 1E 9B 18 40 24 BE 45 8B
:  E8 A6 F6 79 FC EB 98 60 C7 9D 85 E6 C8 4C CC AB
:  14 10 2A 50 AD 96 90 76 A9 82 BB D1 F9 91 48 1B
:  B5 5B A5 E7 6B D3 C8 E6 D4 C8 9A 44 30 9F E1 DF
:  C2 B5 6F ED 7D E7 E6 3C 01 07 BA 28 DA E4 06 E0
:  04 22 6F 50 0F 58 74 A3 F1 71 B2 CD 74 68 27 73
:  CF 14 31 91 F8 14 F5 13 E0 6A ED 00 7D D6 10 D8
:  69 94 99 37 DD A4 B1 83 41 46 75 9C BC 7D 7F 2C
:  A5 E3 46 6E AC C9 AE 75 87 F0 FD AC C5 52 12 EC
:  F3 FB 89 78 00 E7 C7 40 C6 59 98 F5 FA 15 6D 79
:  8D AE 88 4A 60 F9 E3 61 6C 20 0A 48 61 7D D0 69
:  4B 9E 27 A7 0E 81 2D 12 FB 12 78 11 4A EF 96 B5
:  6D D4 E1 D1 4C 46 15 25 70 E6 BA 07 45 62 0C 8C
:  77 D0 67 5D 07 6C 1C A3 59 4F E5 FE A3 F0 DF 8C
:  D5 9A BA 30 B5 35 8E 36 10 DA 20 7C E4 69 EA 17
:  2C A4 72 32 E0 D4 30 92 DF B3 79 41 F1 C9 83 DC
:  90 DF 69 4A 14 39 2F CE 7D CE 1A 03 62 7A 82 0D
:  79 A5 BD FC 69 25 9D 05 71 97 1D A3 C3 BF 06 EF
:  EE 1D E5 2F BE CB 26 AC 7A 84 2F 1F AF D1 5A D9
:  4A CC 97 11 70 27 4F 35 78 1E 74 10 8C AD 58 A9
:  54 8D 6A 05 B0 5C 51 A6 6E 5F 5D 40 5A 25 53 CD
:  7A EF 82 F4 FC 89 06 5C 0E CE BA 2C 18 B2 7F 90

```

```
: D3 0C AF 56 B1 17 15 47 6A DA 40 3D 3E 32 EA D4
: }
```

Time stamp root "InfoCert Time Stamping Authority 3"

```
0 1755: SEQUENCE {
4 1219: SEQUENCE {
8 3: [0] {
10 1: INTEGER 2
: }
13 1: INTEGER 1
16 13: SEQUENCE {
18 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
29 0: NULL
: }
31 126: SEQUENCE {
33 11: SET {
35 9: SEQUENCE {
37 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
42 2: PrintableString 'IT'
: }
: }
46 24: SET {
48 22: SEQUENCE {
50 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
55 15: UTF8String 'InfoCert S.p.A.'
: }
: }
72 12: SET {
74 10: SEQUENCE {
76 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11)
81 3: UTF8String 'TSA'
: }
: }
86 26: SET {
88 24: SEQUENCE {
90 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '2 5 4 97'
95 17: UTF8String 'VATIT-07945211006'
: }
: }
114 43: SET {
116 41: SEQUENCE {
118 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
123 34: UTF8String 'InfoCert Time Stamping Authority 3'
: }
: }
: }
159 30: SEQUENCE {
161 13: UTCTime 07/06/2021 08:19:06 GMT
176 13: UTCTime 07/06/2033 09:19:06 GMT
: }
191 126: SEQUENCE {
193 11: SET {
195 9: SEQUENCE {
197 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
202 2: PrintableString 'IT'
: }
: }
206 24: SET {
208 22: SEQUENCE {
210 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
215 15: UTF8String 'InfoCert S.p.A.'
```

```

:    }
:    }
232 12: SET {
234 10: SEQUENCE {
236 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11)
241 3: UTF8String 'TSA'
:    }
:    }
246 26: SET {
248 24: SEQUENCE {
250 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '2 5 4 97'
255 17: UTF8String 'VATIT-07945211006'
:    }
:    }
274 43: SET {
276 41: SEQUENCE {
278 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
283 34: UTF8String 'InfoCert Time Stamping Authority 3'
:    }
:    }
:    }
319 546: SEQUENCE {
323 13: SEQUENCE {
325 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
336 0: NULL
:    }
338 527: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
343 522: SEQUENCE {
347 513: INTEGER
:    00 E2 74 6C AF FB 6F 8E 1C AF C0 BF 47 F6 6B F9
:    0A B2 58 C9 13 38 EC 92 5C B1 5C 48 2C 45 47 5E
:    8A 2C 52 D7 E0 19 D7 BC F8 C6 F2 97 C8 2A B6 76
:    8C 22 3C CD 75 9D E7 2E D2 8B E7 61 8C 63 71 A2
:    2C DE B3 0C B7 ED 0D 3B C1 8A 87 CC 64 9B 05 07
:    BA 06 1A 17 19 AC C6 DD 8E D0 B3 2B B5 CD 0A C7
:    18 89 AA 3C 21 4F AB 84 92 CF E0 FA 05 D3 DD EC
:    F6 8C EB E8 0D 0A 96 1E 3D 43 E0 6D 10 38 F4 80
:    74 4E 7A FA EF D9 3E A5 DF BE A8 9A 13 1F 1F 20
:    1B B4 E9 A7 65 E9 3E 11 6C 2F 04 33 00 CC 92 8F
:    49 34 83 31 F8 A2 19 34 F3 C0 31 70 1A C2 A3 81
:    03 8D C8 6E 25 3C DE 8A C8 7F 16 9B A7 B9 CD D4
:    7D 8D 8F F2 8D 33 1F 79 4C 3C 71 75 BE 1C C2 7E
:    BF 9F 76 72 D9 99 C2 C5 6D 01 69 EF 4C 14 7A 54
:    A8 89 6A 9C 8F 19 1F FA 03 15 A6 F2 6B 69 4C 04
:    F5 6A 40 ED 11 02 2D DC 70 58 62 25 45 DA E9 68
:    91 2F C4 8C 60 D3 7F 56 A2 40 D3 6D 2A 03 3D D2
:    2A B8 15 49 7D AB A8 19 FF DB 98 78 37 98 54 CB
:    F9 BA 7A F2 57 FF B7 D8 54 34 97 63 18 A4 01 9B
:    7F E0 3C C5 ED E7 1C 14 BF 4E 8F CB A2 B2 24 0F
:    8B CD 97 AD 80 A7 42 12 5E DF 2E C5 D6 61 86 83
:    72 6B 02 C5 45 E7 69 C6 49 64 D7 B3 43 59 29 DC
:    6E 91 8D 80 DD 11 2B A0 7B EF F9 08 AF B3 A3 97
:    18 87 04 AA FB 08 6D 1C C9 AE FD 77 64 D4 CA 2D
:    06 A9 D2 29 43 25 D0 E4 00 DD D7 3A 51 BA 6A 36
:    9B A2 98 E3 72 BE 42 FB 8D 4A DD C6 35 95 05 BD
:    3F E6 21 0A 70 20 19 E9 1F FC 19 40 A5 45 0A 2D
:    CE F7 01 EF 58 7F D7 56 3D 79 87 98 56 E6 D7 5F
:    88 63 9E 9F DE 6D D9 67 19 EF 28 66 11 84 AE 31
:    A1 43 C1 24 C7 15 42 56 42 33 AE 4E 3E 43 F5 EC
:    98 79 7E CD 20 71 04 74 17 8D 26 37 1C 5A DC DA
:    A9 09 6D 44 C8 F6 BB B9 B4 3D 63 5B 33 66 7F 05
:    55
864 3: INTEGER 65537
:    }
:    }

```

```

      :   }
869 354: [3] {
873 350: SEQUENCE {
877 15: SEQUENCE {
879 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
884 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
887 5: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
889 3: SEQUENCE {
891 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
      :   }
      :   }
      :   }
894 88: SEQUENCE {
896 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32)
901 81: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
903 79: SEQUENCE {
905 77: SEQUENCE {
907 4: OBJECT IDENTIFIER anyPolicy (2 5 29 32 0)
913 69: SEQUENCE {
915 67: SEQUENCE {
917 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cps (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 2 1)
927 55: IA5String
      : 'http://www.firma.infocert.it/documentazione/manu'
      : 'ali.php'
      :   }
      :   }
      :   }
      :   }
      :   }
      :   }
894 193: SEQUENCE {
987 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
992 185: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
995 182: SEQUENCE {
998 179: SEQUENCE {
1001 176: [0] {
1004 173: [0] {
1007 38: [6] 'http://crl.infocert.it/ca3/tsa/ARL.crl'
1047 130: [6]
      : 'ldap://ldap.infocert.it/cn%3DInfoCert%20Time%20S'
      : 'tamping%20Authority%203,ou%3D TSA,o%3DINFOCERT%20'
      : 'SPA,c%3DIT?authorityRevocationList'
      :   }
      :   }
      :   }
      :   }
      :   }
1180 14: SEQUENCE {
1182 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
1187 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
1190 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
1192 2: BIT STRING 1 unused bit
      : '1100000'B
      :   }
      :   }
1196 29: SEQUENCE {
1198 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
1203 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
1205 20: OCTET STRING
      : 2D 92 36 1F 33 B5 37 08 A8 4A 76 1C 1B 21 F1 77
      : C2 9F FA 44
      :   }
      :   }
      :   }

```

```

: }
: }
1227 13: SEQUENCE {
1229 9:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
1240 0:  NULL
: }
1242 513: BIT STRING
:  BC 1B 66 5F 2F 0B AA 17 DA 1D 82 62 F9 64 C8 9D
:  61 01 48 06 27 F2 2E 38 64 67 11 7B D5 4B 87 4A
:  91 03 E9 FB 75 26 47 8D 18 9D D1 B5 BB 40 93 7B
:  23 56 C7 AF 21 CA 45 DF AD EB 01 86 86 AD 16 D8
:  63 7F DE 3E C4 83 29 3B 65 B3 35 1A 77 CA 7A B7
:  53 DB DF 9C EB DD A1 45 24 05 CB D7 BE BE DE 2B
:  E6 D1 9D 21 5F 10 D1 33 17 EB 1E DD 55 5D 21 25
:  0E 9D 6E 65 35 D6 AA A4 81 AF F5 57 FD E5 72 73
:  22 0F 28 03 FE 1E 89 90 56 13 61 FA 97 08 95 3D
:  DE EB CA 6A 22 6C 86 4B 9F 0E 30 D1 97 C8 37 12
:  AF 83 EC 2C 77 82 F0 48 F2 EC 77 61 63 0F 59 86
:  94 D9 00 48 59 3D E7 C2 3C 34 5E 4C 37 30 A2 54
:  9D D7 6D C7 35 6B ED F3 F2 43 BA 7B 9C 6C 75 32
:  F6 9C 7A 20 79 60 55 64 B3 92 AA 82 68 4D 02 BC
:  4B 60 A6 DB E6 B6 DB 06 2E 96 A2 4B BE 1B 89 0D
:  3B A1 5D 39 0C E0 24 52 2A C2 B9 E8 75 68 64 A5
:  3F 44 DB B8 4F D7 48 31 32 39 F2 4F B6 94 B6 21
:  B5 1F 78 C7 47 65 6E BF 85 54 E5 B0 82 15 92 36
:  1B 74 65 0C 8E 43 9B 4E 05 B1 C3 A7 CE 1B 8F 64
:  F4 1E 89 76 32 04 89 F7 17 02 1D A4 1A B2 9B 90
:  E2 29 EA D0 DA 72 A9 2C EB 87 AA 7C 12 B2 EA B6
:  8A 7F F2 39 0F 71 E2 62 EC FE 99 55 95 BF 61 F7
:  33 D3 BF F1 C3 5E 77 D0 EB 3D AC BE 73 22 7A 6B
:  1B B9 F8 FE 44 C0 3D 4F F0 E7 6E 97 89 74 F1 F4
:  56 58 8E 4B 05 A9 BE 6B D8 B5 35 64 A6 75 97 69
:  E3 C5 70 67 BE DD 5B 4B B6 6E F1 27 E9 E0 E2 06
:  D8 FE CF 7E 1D C5 54 3F CC 90 3C 04 79 22 F8 5D
:  CC 06 BC 3A 99 ED 95 44 9E C3 34 4F 31 8B DE 2F
:  E0 D9 66 3E 71 7E 82 72 82 0B E1 D7 D4 41 2D 04
:  AE 82 2D C8 85 6B 1B 8D 23 3D 4A 99 CD D5 07 A5
:  3C 98 B6 D2 08 22 9C 35 0A 34 03 4A 85 3F 89 3B
:  D2 38 A3 F3 E0 76 68 9F DA 23 0B 5F EE 1D C7 4C
: }

```

Time stamp root "InfoCert Time Stamping Authority EC 4"

```

0 796: SEQUENCE {
4 674: SEQUENCE {
8 3:  [0] {
10 1:  INTEGER 2
:  }
13 20:  INTEGER 22 82 47 7C A2 1F 60 F2 A5 19 D7 37 A5 5B C7 11 21 34 FA 17
35 10:  SEQUENCE {
37 8:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsaWithSHA384 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 3)
:  }
47 129: SEQUENCE {
50 11:  SET {
52 9:  SEQUENCE {
54 3:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
59 2:  PrintableString 'IT'
:  }
:  }
63 24:  SET {
65 22:  SEQUENCE {
67 3:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)

```

```

72 15:    UTF8String 'InfoCert S.p.A.'
:    }
:    }
89 12:    SET {
91 10:    SEQUENCE {
93 3:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11)
98 3:     UTF8String 'TSA'
:     }
:     }
103 26:   SET {
105 24:   SEQUENCE {
107 3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER '2 5 4 97'
112 17:   UTF8String 'VATIT-07945211006'
:   }
:   }
131 46:   SET {
133 44:   SEQUENCE {
135 3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
140 37:   UTF8String 'InfoCert Time Stamping Authority EC 4'
:   }
:   }
:   }
179 30:   SEQUENCE {
181 13:   UTCTime 07/06/2021 09:07:41 GMT
196 13:   UTCTime 07/06/2036 10:07:41 GMT
:   }
211 129:  SEQUENCE {
214 11:   SET {
216 9:    SEQUENCE {
218 3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
223 2:    PrintableString 'IT'
:    }
:    }
227 24:   SET {
229 22:   SEQUENCE {
231 3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
236 15:   UTF8String 'InfoCert S.p.A.'
:   }
:   }
253 12:   SET {
255 10:   SEQUENCE {
257 3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11)
262 3:    UTF8String 'TSA'
:    }
:    }
267 26:   SET {
269 24:   SEQUENCE {
271 3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER '2 5 4 97'
276 17:   UTF8String 'VATIT-07945211006'
:   }
:   }
295 46:   SET {
297 44:   SEQUENCE {
299 3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
304 37:   UTF8String 'InfoCert Time Stamping Authority EC 4'
:   }
:   }
:   }
343 118:  SEQUENCE {
345 16:   SEQUENCE {
347 7:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecPublicKey (1 2 840 10045 2 1)
356 5:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER secp384r1 (1 3 132 0 34)
:    }
363 98:   BIT STRING
:    04 59 50 57 D6 5A 77 27 BA 0D C6 39 59 41 94 82

```

```

: 3D 2D AE 59 C2 BF F4 3A 77 23 59 CE 82 5D 6A A6
: F4 28 8E BC 34 1B 4B F2 BA 20 41 94 C0 83 9A 0A
: C7 1E 3F C1 80 8E 90 8B 72 75 79 5B 49 C2 E2 D4
: 0A F8 55 AE A0 30 F9 FC 97 DB E5 88 8A 72 67 68
: 6F 67 39 E9 9F 9E AC 7E B5 E3 F6 08 4B FD 7E D8
: 9F
: }
463 216: [3] {
466 213: SEQUENCE {
469 15: SEQUENCE {
471 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
476 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
479 5: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
481 3: SEQUENCE {
483 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
: }
: }
: }
486 88: SEQUENCE {
488 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32)
493 81: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
495 79: SEQUENCE {
497 77: SEQUENCE {
499 4: OBJECT IDENTIFIER anyPolicy (2 5 29 32 0)
505 69: SEQUENCE {
507 67: SEQUENCE {
509 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cps (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 2 1)
519 55: IA5String
: 'http://www.firma.infocert.it/documentazione/manu'
: 'ali.php'
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
576 57: SEQUENCE {
578 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
583 50: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
585 48: SEQUENCE {
587 46: SEQUENCE {
589 44: [0] {
591 42: [0] {
593 40: [6] 'http://crl.ca4.infocert.it/tsaec/ARL.crl'
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
635 14: SEQUENCE {
637 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
642 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
645 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
647 2: BIT STRING 1 unused bit
: '1100000'B
: }
: }
651 29: SEQUENCE {
653 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
658 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
660 20: OCTET STRING
: E4 A6 26 47 FA 24 5B 5F 93 5F 73 9A 2E E5 33 B2
: 69 6E 1B D8
: }

```



```

:   }
:   }
:   }
:   }
682 10: SEQUENCE {
684 8:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsaWithSHA384 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 3)
:   }
694 104: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
697 101: SEQUENCE {
699 49:  INTEGER
:   00 B3 8D 39 22 62 07 3D 7F 69 0F 63 87 20 A2 68
:   A1 FB 54 3C 50 9D 31 65 B3 24 97 1A DB 4F 3B BF
:   52 BE 4D 23 08 BB E4 42 B3 11 15 2F 8E 53 17 B0
:   2E
750 48:  INTEGER
:   17 43 74 68 A6 07 95 F2 D1 7C 00 29 26 BA 17 38
:   8C CF 31 3F 7E 24 31 B2 33 2E F2 FE 82 BA 15 38
:   24 42 12 00 8D 2C D7 A1 5B F4 61 6C FE D1 92 55
:   }
:   }
:   }

```

Time stamp root "InfoCert Basic Time Stamping Authority 3"

```

0 1778: SEQUENCE {
4 1242: SEQUENCE {
8 3:  [0] {
10 1:  INTEGER 2
:   }
13 1:  INTEGER 1
16 13: SEQUENCE {
18 9:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER
:   sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
29 0:  NULL
:   }
31 132: SEQUENCE {
34 11: SET {
36 9:  SEQUENCE {
38 3:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
43 2:  PrintableString 'IT'
:   }
:   }
47 24: SET {
49 22: SEQUENCE {
51 3:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
56 15: UTF8String 'InfoCert S.p.A.'
:   }
:   }
73 12: SET {
75 10: SEQUENCE {
77 3:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11)
82 3:  UTF8String 'TSA'
:   }
:   }
87 26: SET {
89 24: SEQUENCE {
91 3:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER '2 5 4 97'
96 17: UTF8String 'VATIT-07945211006'
:   }
:   }
115 49: SET {
117 47: SEQUENCE {
119 3:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)

```

```

124 40:    UTF8String 'InfoCert Basic Time Stamping Authority 3'
      :    }
      :    }
      :    }
166 30:    SEQUENCE {
168 13:    UTCTime 16/05/2023 09:23:00 GMT
183 13:    UTCTime 16/05/2023 10:23:00 GMT
      :    }
198 132:    SEQUENCE {
201 11:    SET {
203 9:    SEQUENCE {
205 3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
210 2:    PrintableString 'IT'
      :    }
      :    }
214 24:    SET {
216 22:    SEQUENCE {
218 3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
223 15:    UTF8String 'InfoCert S.p.A.'
      :    }
      :    }
240 12:    SET {
242 10:    SEQUENCE {
244 3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11)
249 3:    UTF8String 'TSA'
      :    }
      :    }
254 26:    SET {
256 24:    SEQUENCE {
258 3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER '2 5 4 97'
263 17:    UTF8String 'VATIT-07945211006'
      :    }
      :    }
282 49:    SET {
284 47:    SEQUENCE {
286 3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
291 40:    UTF8String 'InfoCert Basic Time Stamping Authority 3'
      :    }
      :    }
      :    }
333 546:    SEQUENCE {
337 13:    SEQUENCE {
339 9:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
350 0:    NULL
      :    }
352 527:    BIT STRING, encapsulates {
357 522:    SEQUENCE {
361 513:    INTEGER
      :    00 EB CB B6 29 0E DE 57 DC AF BC EE 0B 93 76 D4
      :    22 80 6F AD 6F 98 51 52 5B B6 FF 76 CC 48 91 77
      :    75 96 45 94 61 02 E5 6D 86 05 79 E3 64 D4 9B 28
      :    E6 01 6F 36 86 B5 5D CD 73 E2 9E 99 6C 6B D4 3A
      :    80 5E 07 96 E1 74 93 68 C4 FB 1A A4 88 49 66 08
      :    F4 1D CD 0F B0 3D 51 C6 64 27 2E 71 3D D3 8A 22
      :    04 44 74 F1 0C C0 AA D9 20 D1 3F D7 2E DB 31 1C
      :    B6 B1 82 5D 61 9F 58 26 00 2E 39 0C E2 EB 56 9F
      :    [ Another 385 bytes skipped ]
878 3:    INTEGER 65537
      :    }
      :    }
      :    }
883 363:    [3] {
887 359:    SEQUENCE {
891 15:    SEQUENCE {
893 3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)

```

```

898 1:    BOOLEAN TRUE
901 5:    OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
903 3:      SEQUENCE {
905 1:        BOOLEAN TRUE
          :      }
          :    }
          :  }
908 88:   SEQUENCE {
910 3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32)
915 81:    OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
917 79:      SEQUENCE {
919 77:        SEQUENCE {
921 4:          OBJECT IDENTIFIER anyPolicy (2 5 29 32 0)
927 69:          SEQUENCE {
929 67:            SEQUENCE {
931 8:              OBJECT IDENTIFIER cps (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 2 1)
941 55:              IA5String
                  :            'http://www.firma.infocert.it/documentazione/manu'
                  :            'ali.php'
                  :          }
                  :        }
                  :      }
                  :    }
                  :  }
998 202:  SEQUENCE {
1001 3:   OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
1006 194: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
1009 191:   SEQUENCE {
1012 188:     SEQUENCE {
1015 185:       [0] {
1018 182:         [0] {
1021 39:           [6] 'http://crl.infocert.it/ca3/btsa/ARL.crl'
1062 138:         [6]
                  :       'ldap://ldap.infocert.it/cn%3DInfoCert%20Basic%20'
                  :       'Time%20Stamping%20Authority%203,ou%3D TSA,o%3DINF'
                  :       'OCERT%20SPA,c%3DIT?authorityRevocationList'
                  :     }
                  :   }
                  : }
                  : }
1203 14:  SEQUENCE {
1205 3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
1210 1:    BOOLEAN TRUE
1213 4:    OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
1215 2:      BIT STRING 1 unused bit
          :      '1100000'B
          :    }
          :  }
1219 29:  SEQUENCE {
1221 3:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
1226 22:  OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
1228 20:  OCTET STRING
          :    69 28 87 54 8D 0D AF C6 81 75 FD 72 72 35 A9 8B
          :    D0 6A 76 7F
          :  }
          : }
          : }
          : }
1250 13: SEQUENCE {
1252 9:  OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
1263 0:  NULL

```

```
: }
1265 513: BIT STRING
: 33 44 6A 87 42 34 DB C1 83 73 A1 5F 06 75 2A 51
: 64 FA 51 78 FD 43 96 91 48 83 62 83 A6 90 42 42
: A7 95 F0 92 41 7E CE 48 1E 91 97 82 52 4C D7 30
: 0E 80 43 C0 D3 23 EC 7E 22 F2 CD BC 5A B5 48 43
: F0 2D EE DE C3 77 21 18 37 F0 02 34 E4 4E 6A 9A
: B8 CF 0D 1C 51 1A B8 C9 B9 61 BA 70 1D 2E E5 3F
: E8 44 30 21 5C 27 53 E4 B7 DF 1D D0 81 60 07 C8
: 29 B2 51 80 54 B3 B7 F1 22 CD DC AE 5B E5 F8 A9
: [ Another 384 bytes skipped ]
: }
```

CAUTION

Some formats allow you to enter the executable code (macros or commands) inside the document without this altering the binary structure and activating features that can modify the acts, facts, or data represented in the document itself. Digitally signed files containing such structures do not produce the effects referred to in Article 25 paragraph 2 of the Regulation [1], that is, it cannot be considered equivalent to an autograph signature. The owner must ensure, through the typical features of each product, the absence of such executable code.